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1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
In the literature on English tense usage, expressions of futurity such as
(1) (a) I will/shall leave next week,
(b) I'm going to leave next week.
have already received a lot of attention, especially so in the pedagogical
descriptive tradition of English linguistics (cf. Close, 1977; Haegeman, 1981,
1983; Leech, 1971; Quirk et al, 1985; Palmer, 1974, 1979; Wekker, 1976,
etc.). Although these accounts are attractive, they raise further questions
because most of them do not propose to deal with the problem against a
formal theoretical background. As a consequence, the rules formulated to
describe the use of shall'/will or be going to in (1) tend to be intuitive and often
do not really allow any decisive choice to be made in many instances of
usage. On the other hand, Reichenbach type analyses of tense interpretation
are usually mainly concerned with the general problem of tense rep-
resentation and treat both examples in (1) as illustrations of future tense
without detailed discussion of the contrasts between them.
In this paper I shall try to throw some light on the selection of the future
time expressions in (1). My paper reinterprets the descriptive accounts
referred to above against the background of the theory of utterance
interpretation known as Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). The
descriptive studies amalgamate the different levels of utterance interpretation
and fail to distinguish a sentence-based 'grammatical' level of interpretation
('semantics') from a discourse or context-based non-grammatical level
('pragmatics'). Based on Smith's (1981) discussion of tense and time, I will
try to argue that at the level of sentence meaning be going to and shall/will
are equivalent, and that the difference between them is to be found in
the constraints they impose on the processing in context of the utterance
in which they occur. The two forms are thus interpreted as ways of
[1] This paper was first presented at the LAGB spring meeting in London in 1987 and
subsequently at the IPRA conference in Antwerp in August 1987. I wish to thank the
participants of these conferences and of my pragmatics seminar in Geneva in 1987-8 for
their helpful comments. Thanks are due to the following: Neil Smith, Nigel Vincent and
especially Sten Vikner and two anonymous referees of the Journal of Linguistics. Needless
to say they cannot be held responsible for the way I have used their comments.
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grammatically encoding processing constraints on the utterance in which they
appear. Section 2 provides a review of some of the pedagogical and descrip-
tive literature on be going to, concentrating on Wekker (1976) and on Leech
(1971),2 which offer the most detailed accounts. These descriptive studies will
be the starting point of the analysis. This section also briefly discusses a
Reichenbach type analysis of tense interpretation and the problems that arise
there. Section 3 is mainly descriptive. It focuses on two contextual properties
of be going to: ellipsis and its rare occurrence in association with conditionals.
Section 4 focuses on the parallelism between be going to and the present
perfect. Section 5 proposes an alternative analysis for the selection of
shall/will vs be going to modelled on Smith's (1981) analysis of the present
perfect. Section 6 is more speculative and suggests ways of integrating the
pragmatic account with the 'traditional' accounts of tense representation.
2. BE GOING TO VS WILL3 IN THE LITERATURE
2.1. The descriptive tradition
2.1.1. A semantic distinction. It has often been pointed out that the use of
be going to/ will in English offers major problems to foreign language learners
(cf. Wekker, 1976: 123). An interesting aspect of this problem is that an
inappropriate use of be going to/will cannot usually be said to lead to
ungrammaticality, rather, as is suggested by most authors, it leads to a certain
un-Englishness, and this is often seen as illustrating a lack of idiomaticity. To
suggest that the appropriate use of will or be going to is largely a matter of
idiomaticity seems to imply that it is an accidental property of English rather
than being systematic. As we shall see below there is certainly a systematicity
in the use of either construction in English. Moreover the use of the verb go
in future tense constructions is not a property of English only but is widely
found in other Germanic and Romance languages (see Fleischman, 1982,
and Vet, 1984, for discussion of the Romance data). I shall not go into these
other languages here but I would of course hope that the account proposed
here may carry over to at least some of them.
The observation that an inappropriate use of be going to or will does not
cause ungrammaticality or semantic anomaly is important, though, as it
might suggest that we are not dealing with the violation of a formal
grammatical principle of tense selection but rather with the infringement of
some principle governing the appropriate use of a construction in a context,
[2] I have used the first edition of Leech's book for quotations. A second edition appeared in
1987.
[3] I am only going to be concerned with the so called 'pure future' or 'future tense' use of
shall and will and will not go into the other meanings attributed to these modals. I also do
not enter into the discussion as to whether the future tense is to be treated on a par with
past and present tense (cf. Palmer, 1974, i979;Haegeman, 1981,1983; Wekker, 1976). From
now on I will use the modal will to represent the future tense.
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i.e. a pragmatic principle. This point of view differs from the general
assumptions made more or less explicitly in the standard literature on the
issue.4 When discussing the contrast between will and be going to, most
authors seem to argue that there is a clear semantic difference between the
two. The quotations below are illustrative and other similar ones can be
found in the literature.
Concerning be going to Leech (1971) writes:
If there is one general meaning that can be attached to this construction,
it is FUTURE FULFILMENT OF THE PRESENT. In fact, however, it is useful to
discriminate between two meanings, the FUTURE CULMINATION OF PRESENT
INTENTION and the FUTURE CULMINATION OF PRESENT CAUSE. (54, italics
mine, capitals his)
The future culmination of present intention and the future culmination of
present cause are illustrated in (2 a) and (2 b) respectively.
(2) (a) They're going to get married in a registry office,
(b) She's going to have another baby.
Given that Leech does not use any theoretical background, it is not obvious
what he means by the term 'meaning'. It would be interesting to know
whether Leech considers will and be going to to be truth conditionally
distinct. Furthermore, if be going to has two 'meanings' then one might infer
that it will on occasions be ambiguous between two interpretations,
' intention' and ' cause'. It seems to me, though, that it would be hard to treat
the examples with be going to as 'ambiguous' in a truth conditional sense.
Consider, for instance, the following example:
(3) They are going to get married.
If be going to is genuinely ambiguous, this sentence would have two
interpretations, with different truth conditions:
(a) There are present indications that they are going to get married.
(b) They intend to get married.
However it would seem to me that a sentence like (4) is a contradiction:
(4) They are going to get married but they are not going to get married.
It does not seem that (4) can be interpreted as:
(c) 'They intend to get married, but there are no present indications that
they are getting married'.
Only by adding further contextual information could the two inter-
pretations be brought out. This would support the idea that be going to is
[4] It is possible that the approach adopted here may also be used to throw light on aspectual
distinctions. This will have to be the object of further research (cf. Ehrlich, 1987; Hopper,
1979, 1982).
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vague between the various interpretations suggested and that the context
determines more specific readings.
Note also that indeed (3) can simultaneously have both interpretations (a)
and (b). If the sentence is genuinely ambiguous this would be rather
unexpected. (I return to this point in 5.2.3.)
Wekker (1976) offers a very comprehensive survey of the literature on be
going to and he too distinguishes it from will in terms of semantics:
the semantic condition governing the use of be going to is the fact that there
must be indications in the present that something will happen (126, italics
mine)
Will and be going to are said to have different 'implications'. For be going to
its implication is loosely that there are indications in the present that
something will happen (124, italics mine)
It contrasts with will whose 'orientation is towards the future' (125). Again
in Wekker's work terms such as 'semantic condition' or 'implication' are
pre-theoretical. In these circumstances it is hard to decide what the term
' implication' in the citation above is supposed to refer to: logical entailment,
presupposition or possibly generalized conventional or conversational
implicature (cf. Grice, 1975). While mention is made of stylistic factors
determining the choice of be going to vs will, it seems that the author
considers the basic contrasts to be 'semantic', i.e. confined to the level of
grammatical sentence-meaning.
Most other studies in the descriptive tradition implicitly argue for a
semantic opposition between will and be going to, but in one earlier
discussion of the English verb Palmer (1974: 163) argues that in many cases
there is no such contrast:
In most cases there is no demonstrable difference between will /shall and BE
GOING TO though many scholars have looked without success for one.5
It will turn out that Palmer's informal account is the one that I shall be
adopting later on. In subsequent work, however, Palmer adopts Wekker's
(1976) analysis.
2.1.2.'Present orientation' vs 'future orientation'. As the above citations have
already indicated, it is generally agreed that be going to conveys 'present
orientation'. In this section I shall briefly review the content that this concept
is given. Wekker (1976: 124) provides a fairly detailed description of his view
of' present orientation':
it is clear that the notion of present indication, circumstances or conditions
must be taken in a rather wide sense. It must, for example, include such
[5] As will be seen below, Palmer's (1974) analysis is thus close to my own.
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ideas a s ' present cause' o r ' present intention'... which, in a very real sense,
are felt by the speaker to be present circumstances associated with a future
event or action.
The description of the notion 'present orientation' is not very precise. Note,
for example, that Leech (1971: 56) also points out that the notion of'present
determination of the future' is not well-defined:
If one takes a fatalistic view of the future, of course, any coming event,
however remote, may be thought to have its seeds in the present, and in
any case, there is often in people's speech a sense of destiny vague enough
to bring be going to almost as close to a neutral' future tense' as will/shall.
This quotation is interesting because Leech seems to admit that the speaker's
own background assumptions may determine the selection of one form or the
other, which again hints at a pragmatic factor in the selection of the form.
In his discussion of shall/will Wekker (1976: 39) writes:
will and shall may function as markers of the future tense... the future may
be used to express a wide variety of nuances of meaning... the meaning of
this tense may range from a plain or purely factual statement about the
future...to a more tentative speculation or prognostication.
But notions such as 'prognostication' and 'speculation' also suggest a
present basis for the future prediction and the suggestion of a link between
present and future is reinforced in the following quotation (Wekker 1976:
67):
future reference is necessarily based on the speaker's knowledge, beliefs
and assumptions
These quotations lead us to conclude that there is no clear line to be drawn
between the meaning of will in contrast to that of be going to and that often
it is the speaker's perception of the future event as being either firmly
embedded in the present or more related to future events which is decisive.
One might try to sharpen the discussion of the so-called semantic contrast
between be going to and will by using some formal contrast such as
cooccurrence constraints with time adverbs. But compatibility with time
adverbs is not unproblematic: both will and be going to cooccur with now
which seems to be the prototype of a present time adverb.
(5) (a) Now I'm going to have to take this dress to the cleaners again,
(b) Now we'll have no money at the end of the month, (cf. the
discussion in Haegeman, 1983: 155)
One problem with the examples in (5) is that the adverb now is not just
temporal. Rather, it suggests that the event expressed in the main proposition
is the consequence of a prior event. A more likely candidate to bring out
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contrasts is already. In Haegeman (1983a: 156) it is shown that already
cooccurs with be going to rather than will:
(6) (a) We are already going to have the kitchen redecorated, we cannot
have the builders in too.
(b) ?We already will have the kitchen redecorated, ...
Like now, already is more than a simple time adverb which locates the event
or state in the sentence at some point in time. Already relates this event to the
other events in the immediate context. Consider for instance:
(7) (a) The secretary had left when John arrived.
(b) The secretary had already left when John arrived.
In (7 a) the secretary's departure may coincide with or precede John's arrival
but in (7 b) already seems to force the latter reading (cf. Hornstein's
discussion 1977: 547-8). Given that already is used as a means of organizing
a proposition with respect to its context, it can be argued that it has a
discourse function: it imposes 'pragmatic' constraints on processing. It is
important that precisely such a ' pragmatic' adverb distinguishes between be
going to and will.
2.2. The Reichenbach approach to tense interpretation
It has become customary to view tense interpretation in terms of semantic
analysis and one type of analysis that has gained some popularity is that
proposed by Reichenbach. I shall not go into a full discussion of the merits
of the approach here (see for example Vikner, 1985, and Enc, 1987, for recent
criticisms of this approach). I shall merely examine here how the contrast
between will and be going to could be stated in Reichenbachian terms. As is
well known, Reichenbach uses three components to determine the temporal
location of a proposition:
(8) (i) S: the moment of speech
(ii) E: the time of the event
(iii) R: the reference point
He proposes the following representations for the simple past and the present
perfect in English:
(9) (a) Simple past John left. E, R S
(b) Present perfect John has left. E R,S
He further proposes that the will future is ambivalent between the following
interpretations:
(10) (a) S,R E
(b) S R,E
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He arrives at this conclusion on the basis of the observation that both a
present time adverb and a future time adverb can be associated with the
construction:
(11) (a) Now I shall go.
(b) I shall go tomorrow.
In this account time adverbs are said to identify uniquely the position of R.
But, as Hornstein (1977) shows, this restriction cannot be maintained. A
present time adverb and a future time adverb may be present simultaneously
in a sentence with will:
(11) (c) Now we'll have no money at the end of the month.
As we have already seen, be going to allows for the same adverbial
specifications:
(12) (a) Now I'm going to go.
(b) I'm going to go tomorrow.
(c) Now I'm going to have no money at the end of the month.
Reichenbach's own account does not deal with this use of be going to. He
only discusses the construction in the light of the 'posterior future' (see
discussion in Section 6.3). If we adopt his analysis of will and use
cooccurrence with time adverbials as the diagnostic for the tense rep-
resentations, then (11) and (12) lead us to conclude that will and be going to
will have the same tense representation, namely that in (10). If these
representations are to be related to truth conditions (see discussion in Section
5.1), then we should conclude that w///and be going to are truth conditionally
equivalent. This means that there would be an asymmetry with the past time
expressions as presented in (9), which should be truth conditionally distinct
since they have distinct tense representations.
Alternatively we could adapt Reichenbach's proposal for French future
time expressions to the English constructions.
(13) (a) Futur proche: Je vais voir Jean S,R E
I go see Jean
(b) Futur simple: Je verrai Jean S R,E
I will-see Jean
(see discussion in Fleischman (1982) for similarities between aller and be
going to). The representation in (13 a) would be used for be going to and that
in (13 b) for will.
(14) (a) I'm going to see John. S,R E
(b) I shall see John. S R,E
There would then be a parallelism between the two expressions for past time
in (9) and those for futurity in (14). We return to this parallelism below
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(Section 4). The fact that be going to in (14a) and the present perfect are
morphologically present tense could be related to the positioning of the
reference point. On this assumption, the contrast between 'present
orientation' for be going to and ' future orientation' for will can also be seen
as a function of the position of the reference point R. For will it is associated
with the time of the event E, i.e. it is in the future; for be going to R is
associated with the moment of speech, the present. However, the tense
representations in (14) could no longer be related to cooccurrences with
adverbials such as now, as suggested by Reichenbach. As we have seen, the
adverb already would be more appropriate. I return to this issue in
Section 6.
In the following sections I shall first return to the data and consider in
more detail the contexts in which the expressions are used.
3. CONTEXTUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF BE GOING TO
Apart from the cooccurrence with already mentioned above we can identify
other properties of the constructions analysed which hint at pragmatic
distinctions in that they relate to contextualization rather than to sentence
bound phenomena.
3.1. Ellipsis
One interesting aspect of the use of be going to as opposed to will is pointed
out by Binnick (1972) and discussed in Wekker (1976: 127). Binnick observes
that a sentence containing will is often felt to be elliptical in the sense that it
is incomplete as it stands. Such an ' elliptical' sentence may be completed by
another clause, or by material presented in an earlier sentence or phrase. On
the other hand, he claims, a sentence with be going to is never felt to be
elliptical; it is complete as it stands. Thus (15a) is felt to be elliptical, (15b)
is not:
(15) (a) The rock will fall.
(b) The rock is going to fall.6
One question is what it means for (15a) to be 'elliptical'. Presumably the
implication is not that obligatory or optional sentence internal material is
[6] As pointed out by one anonymous referee, the intonation plays an important part in these
examples. I shall not go into the role of intonation here. It would appear that intonation
is a guide offered by the speaker for the interpretation of the utterance. In an example like
(i) below, rising intonation, for instance, will indicate that, contrary to the overt form, the
sentence is to be taken as a question:
(i) You are not going.
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missing (cf. Wekker's discussion) or has been deleted. What seems to be at
issue is that while a sentence with be going to can appear fairly naturally
without there being any linguistic context, a will sentence like (15 a) requires
such a context. Wekker (1976: 128) explains the phenomenon as follows:
ellipsis is a secondary phenomenon which can be explained in terms of the
notion of logical dependence upon other events implied or overtly
expressed in the context. In other words, inherent in the meaning of be
going to is the implication that there are present indications or
circumstances which suggest that something will happen. This is the reason
why sentences with be going to are never felt to be elliptical as they stand.
On the other hand, sentences containing will/shall are often elliptical,
precisely because it is not inherent in their meaning that all conditions for
the future event have necessarily been met.
This explanation is not entirely satisfactory. It is not stated when exactly
sentences with will/shall will be felt to be elliptical (cf. Wekker's use of
' often'). Also, it is not obvious why precisely the will sentence, which was
said to lack inherent implications as to present conditioning of the future,
should be the one that is incomplete without explicitation of the conditions
of the future event. Given that the notion ' inherent implication' is rather
vague, it is hard to pin down exactly Wekker's analysis.
3.2. Conditionals
It has been pointed out (cf. Leech, 1971: 56) that conditional sub-clauses are
relatively rare with be going to. Leech contrasts the following (his judgments
are given):
(16) (a) If you accept that job, you'll never regret it.
(b) *If you accept that job, you're never going to regret it.
Leech points out that the incompatibility of be going to with conditionals is
not absolute:
be going to is suitable, however, if present circumstances are mentioned in
the (/"-clause; i.e. if the condition is a present one rather than a future one:
(16) (c) We're going to find ourselves in difficulty if we carry on like this.
(Leech 1971: 56)
But in the right context, even (16b) would not be ungrammatical. For
instance, to someone who has just announced that he is accepting that job,
(16 b) would be an appropriate reply. (16 b) would be inappropriate, it seems
to me, though not ungrammatical, if both the event in the conditional sub-
clause and that in the main clause are firmly to be placed in the future.
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4. F U T U R E TIME AND PAST TIME: A COMPARISON
An important feature of the use of be going to was pointed out in earlier work
by Joos (1964: 141 ftn):
the meaning of BE GOING TO ... turns out to be exact reversal, in every detail
..., of the meaning of the perfect phrase.
According to Joos (1964: 140):
the perfect phase means that the event is not mentioned for its own sake
but for the sake of its consequences.
We conclude from this that be going to is used to refer to a future event that
is not mentioned for its own sake but for the sake of its causes, an
interpretation which is in line with those discussed above. The parallelism
with the present perfect is also pointed out elsewhere. Wekker (1976: 125)
discusses the following example:
(17) (a) Finally, tonight, on to the weather forecast for the South. The
night is going to be rather cloudy, but most places will remain
dry. The temperature will fall around 40 near the coast,... and
the winds, they'll be south-east... (from Nationwide, BBC
20.2.75)
Wekker writes:
there is obviously very little difference in meaning between be going to and
will in this spoken weather forecast. But the interesting point here is that
this forecast like several others... begins with be going to, and then
continues with will. This, I claim, is not merely a matter of style... but also
something which has to do with the implications inherent in be going to
and the will/shall construction. The explanation for this use of be going to
is that the television weather man begins his forecast, as normally in
conversation, from present indications or circumstances (such as the black
clouds gathering, or after reading the newspaper forecast), and then
switches his attention to the future, using will. A similar shift of perspective
occurs elsewhere in the grammar: it often happens that a story or a song
begins with the present perfect and then switches to the past tense. (1976:
125)
(17 b) illustrates a shift from present perfect to past tense parallel to the shift
from be going to to will illustrated in (17a).
(17) (b) A collection of 45 drawings... has been sold by Sotheby's in New
York for $21,288,300...They were owned by Mr John Gaines, a
race horse breeder whose fortune came from a dog food
company. Mr Gaines decided to sell... {Guardian 19.11.86, p. 2
coll 3-5)
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The symmetry between past tense/ present perfect and will/be going to is also
implied by Palmer (1979) who subsumes both present perfect and be going to
under the label 'current' orientation. Other authors use the term 'current
relevance' and have seen the same dimension as characterising the difference
between will and be going to (see Fleischman, 1982). Wekker links the shift
from be going to to will in (17 a) to a change in perspective. Though he himself
discusses this as a ' grammatical phenomenon', it seems that the shift of tenses
has more to do with principles of discourse organization. In other words, it
is not a sentence based phenomenon but one that deals with sentences in
context, that is with pragmatics.
The parallelism between be going to and the present perfect also comes out
in the fact that both are compatible with the time adverb already (see 2.1.2).
5. PRAGMATICS AND TENSE SELECTION
Smith (1981) presents a new analysis of tenses based on the theory of
utterance interpretation known as Relevance Theory as developed by
Sperber and Wilson (1986). I shall try to give a brief survey of the main points
of the theory here. Obviously, its full scope cannot be developed here and the
interested reader is referred to the literature.
5.1. Relevance theory
5.1.1. The principle of relevance. Central to Sperber and Wilson's theory is
the concept of relevance. The interpretation of an utterance is subject to the
principle of relevance, according to which speakers will try to maximize
relevance. A proposition is relevant if it creates some contextual effect. An
utterance will have some contextual effect if its interpretation in a specific
context will allow the hearer to draw conclusions which he could not have
drawn either from the context on its own or from the utterance on its own.
In other words, a proposition is relevant if it can be hooked up to a context,
a set of propositions available either in the linguistic context or in the
memory store of the hearer. Consider for example the exchange in (18):
(18) A: If Ann is here the party will be a success.
B: Ann is here.
From the proposition expressed by A and that expressed by B one is entitled
to draw the inference, by Modus Ponens, that 'the party will be a success'.
This conclusion cannot be arrived at on the basis solely of either the
utterance B on its own or the context A on its own. The conclusion is only
achieved by the interplay of the utterance B and its context. We then can say
that B has a contextual effect in the context in (18).
Relevance is not an absolute notion. The contextual effect of an utterance
is obtained at some cost: the hearer must process the utterance against the
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context. If the processing cost increases, the relevance diminishes. Compare
the exchange in (18) with that in (19):
(19) A: If Ann is here the party will be a success.
B: Ann has come by car.
Even though (19 B) still allows us to draw the conclusion that ' the party will be
a success', it is less relevant than (18 B) because it involves more processing.
Two steps would be needed to arrive at the conclusion: the hearer would first
have to derive from (19 B) that Ann is here and then he could derive that the
party will be a success. A speaker who simply wanted to convey that Ann is
here and therefore that the party will be a success would not have respected
the principle of relevance: he could have saved the hearer some processing
effort by simply saying (18 B). The additional information in (19 B) merely
involves extra processing without any added contextual effect.7
5.1.2. Processing constraints. Blakemore (1985), using the Relevance
framework, shows how certain linguistic elements such as the co-called
pragmatic connectors (e.g. 50, also, etc.) fail to contribute to the truth
conditions of the proposition(s) with which they are associated. Rather, they
function as guidelines for the processing of the utterance in a context. After
all, for instance, indicates that the proposition it is associated with is to be
taken as a premise which can be used to support a conclusion.
(20) A: John is going to the LAGB.
B: After all, he is a linguist.
After all in (20 B) indicates that the proposition ' he is a linguist' can be used
as a premise to derive the conclusion that 'John is going to the LAGB'. In
order to derive the conclusion the hearer will have to access another
proposition which he will retrieve from his background knowledge, namely
that 'linguists go to the LAGB'. The reasoning would be as follows:
(21) (i) All linguists go to the LAGB. (from encyclopaedic knowledge)
(ii) John is a linguist.
Hence:
(iii) John is going to the LAGB.
The addition of after all in (20 B) guides the hearer of the utterance with
respect to its interpretation. It increases the relevance of the utterance not
because it adds more contextual inferences, but because it reduces the
processing effort needed to derive the inferences. Compare (20) with (22):
(22) A: John is going to the LAGB.
B: He is a linguist.
[7] Note though that this too is relative. If the hearer had available as background knowledge
the assumption that whenever Ann comes by car she is in a foul mood, then (17B) would
allow him to draw the inference that though Ann is here the party may not be a success.
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After all in (20 B) does not contribute to the truth conditions of the sentence.
It is not possible to imagine, for example, that (20 B) might be true in a
certain context and (22 B) false. Although the hearer of (22 B) might be led
to draw the same conclusions as the hearer of (20 B) (see (21)), alternative
interpretations are possible. The hearer of (22 B) might for example consider
this utterance itself as a conclusion drawn from (22 A), on the basis of the
following reasoning:
(23) (i) All linguists go to the LAGB.
(ii) John is going to the LAGB.
Hence:
(iii) John is a linguist.
The speaker of (20 B) saves the hearer processing efforts by enabling him to
choose immediately between the two interpretations of the proposition 'John
is a linguist'. After all signals unequivocally that the utterance is to be taken
as a premise. If instead the speaker had wished to make it clear that the
utterance was to be taken as a conclusion, he could have introduced it with
so:
(24) A: John is going to the LAGB.
B: So, he is a linguist.
5.2. Relevance and tense selection
5.2.1. Simple past and present perfect. Using the Relevance framework,
Smith (1981) applies the idea that linguistic elements may encode processing
instructions to the English tense system. Discussing the following examples:
(25) (a) John has scored a goal, (his (38))
(b) John scored a goal, (his (39))
he says
Despite claims to the contrary... there is no good evidence that the past
and the perfect are ever truth-conditionally distinct...they can never be
consistently asserted and denied at the same time (1981: 259)
and concludes:
the implication of this truth-conditional equivalence is that the contrast
between [25 a] and [25 b] is at least in part pragmatic (1981: 260)
In Smith's view the present perfect contains 'a subjective element
incorporating the event described into the time of speech':
it indicates that the propositions relevant to the interpretation of the
sentence include some present tense ones (1981: 260)
In other words, the present perfect encodes an instruction for the processing
of the proposition expressed: an utterance containing a present perfect must
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be processed at least partly against a present tense background or it must not
be processed exclusively against past tense propositions. The fact that the
present perfect is morphologically a present tense can clearly be related to
this. The morphological tense determines the contextualizaton of the
utterance.8
As Smith points out, his proposal is in line with the traditional descriptive
treatments of the present perfect in terms of'current relevance', but it refines
these analyses in explicitly situating the notion in the pragmatic domain of
utterance interpretation. Let me just illustrate Smith's proposal with an
example drawn from his article (examples (43H47))» which is in turn taken
from Sperber and Wilson (1981).
(26) (a) If the chairman resigns, Jackson will take over his duties.
(b) If Jackson takes over the chairman's duties, the company will go
bankrupt.
(c) The chairman has resigned.
By two applications of Modus Ponens, the propositions in (26) allow the
conclusions:
(27) Jackson will take over the chairman's duties.
(28) The company will go bankrupt.
Concerning these examples Smith says:
It is clear that if [26 c] were replaced by [29]:
[29] The chairman resigned.
there would be no such contextual implications. Although truth-
conditionally equivalent to [26 c], the utterance of [29] in the simple past
does not license the appropriate interaction with [26 a] whose protasis is
present and is therefore irrelevant in this context (Smith, 1981: 261).
Smith also tries to explain the formal constraints on the use of the present
perfect.9
Perfect have is tied to speech time and is accordingly inappropriate if it
occurs with elements which designate any period necessarily exclusive of
[8] I shall maintain the assumption that truth conditions are determined at the level of
semantics although this is not uncontroversial (see Kempson, I988a,b,c, for discussion
and also Sections 5.1 and 5.2 below).
[9] Smith does not discuss the fact that in many other languages the present perfect is
compatible with past time adverbs:
(i) French
Je l'ai vu hier.
I have seen him yesterday,
(ii) Dutch
Ik heb hem gisteren geizien.
I have seen him yesterday.
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the present, e.g. temporal adverbials such as yesterday, phrases containing
ago, last, etc. Accordingly, if have occurs with adverbials of this sort the
utterance will if possible be reinterpreted as a habitual encompassing the
present: Thus [30]:
[30] ?John has gone to Morocco on the 1st of June
is acceptable only if the sentence is amplified with an overt frequentative,
as in [31]:
[31] John has gone to Morocco on the 1st of June every year since
1931.
or if the context makes a frequentative reading self-evident (Smith 1981:
262).
He does not extend his analysis to complex tenses such as the past perfect
where in fact both have and a past tense are present (see discussion below
6.3).
5.2.2. Be going to and will as constraints on processing. I would like to
propose that Smith's analysis of the present perfect can be applied to the
expressions of future time discussed here. Be going to is like the present perfect
in that it imposes a constraint on the processing of the proposition with
which it is associated. It signals that this proposition is relevant in a context
including at least some present tense propositions, or, in other words, it
guarantees a contextual effect if the utterance is processed against a present
context. Will, on the other hand, signals that the hearer should extend the
immediately accessible (present) context for the processing of the proposition
and should process the utterance against future propositions. The selection
of either be going to or will is thus relevant in that it indicates not simply that
an event will take place in the future but also that the proposition expressing
that event should be processed against a certain type of background for its
contextual effect. The selection of either future time expression will reduce
the processing cost.
At this point the reader might very well object than my proposal is not
fundamentally different from the descriptive accounts discussed above: again
be going to orients the utterance towards a present context or places it in
present perspective, while will is future-oriented. This observation is correct.
However, there is a principled distinction between my account and the
informal descriptions offered earlier. In my proposal the distinction between
the interpretations of will and be going to is not one that is part of the
sentence grammar. The contrast is one that comes into play at the level of
contextualization of the utterance, since these various expressions of future
time contain processing instructions.
Following Smith's account of the distinction between present perfect and
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simple past one could say that truth-conditionally sentences such as (32 a)
and (32b) are equivalent (see Section 5.2 though):
(32) (a) I'll kill him.
(b) I'm going to kill him.
One cannot simultaneously affirm (32 a) and deny (32 b), for instance. The
role of the selection of the distinct future time expressions constructions is to
save processing cost by constraining the possible contextualizations of the
proposition. In a present tense context such as (32c), (32a) is less appropriate
than (32 b) because the former requires an extension outside the present
context and the latter does not:
(32) (c) What are you doing?
Let us turn to some illustrations of the approach I am advocating here by
looking at examples of contextualization.
5.3. Future time expressions and context
5.3.1. Ellipsis and will. In (32 b) be going to signals that the utterance
containing it is to be processed in the present, i.e. in the immediately
accessible context. In (32 a) will signals that the relevant context is future.
This does not necessarily mean that there must always be an overt linguistic
co-text for processing a proposition. First of all, any utterance has a present
context by default: any utterance will be made at some time and in some
situation. Confronted with an utterance containing be going to, the hearer
will access present propositions whether these be linguistically realized or
part of the present background of the utterance. On the other hand,
confronted with an utterance with will, the hearer will have to access future
propositions. These propositions again need not be realized in the context,
but it is less likely that the speaker will be able to have recourse to a default
future context. The accessing of a future context is therefore less
straightforward and it is not surprising that in isolation an utterance such as
(15a), repeated here for convenience as (33) is felt to be incomplete:
(33) The rock will fall.
The incompleteness of (33) is not due to the fact that sentence-internal
material is missing. Rather the hearer perceives the utterance as incomplete
because he lacks any clues as to the contextualization of the utterance: he
needs further guidelines as to where to access the future propositions in
which to process the proposition expressed by (33).
In certain circumstances, however, an utterance with will in isolation may
not be felt to be incomplete at all. Consider the following example:
(34) You'll wake up the baby.
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In a context where someone is moving noisily through the house, (34) does
not need a contextual specification of the future context to be accessed:
clearly what the speaker intends is: 'if you go on making so much noise you
will waken her up and then the consequences will be. . . ' . In the context
sketched it is clear which future propositions must be accessed and there is
nothing deficient about (34).
5.2.2. Conditionals. The observation made above (Section 3.2) that the use of
conditionals was restricted very much to wi'//-sentences is not surprising.
Assuming that the antecedent of a conditional sentence serves as a context
setter (cf. Haiman, 1978 on conditionals as topics and more recently Smith
& Smith, 1988) we may expect that only present time conditions will work
well with be going to. A future antecedent would imply a contradiction in the
processing instructions, be going to directing the hearer to a present time
context and the future antecedent fixing a future context. Hence the oddness
of (35 a) as opposed to (35 b) or (35c):
(35) (a) You're going to be fired if you ever go near his computer.
(b) You'll be fired if you ever go near his computer.
(c) You're going to be fired if you go on like this.
In (35 a) the time adverb ever refers to the future, hence the most immediately
accessible context which the speaker is putting forward is not the one that the
use of be going to would make the hearer turn to. On the basis of be going
to the hearer would expect that the context is a present time proposition. In
(35 b), on the other hand, the future time referred to in the conditional
subclause (ever) is appropriate because the main clause contains will. (35 c) is
also appropriate: the adverbial like this relates to the present time. Thus the
context that is given in the subclause is the one expected on the basis of the
use of be going to.1"
5.2.3. Present indication, present cause, present intention. Following the
proposal above that be going to constrains the processing of the proposition
with which it is associated to the present context, we no longer see the
different notions such as present intention, present indication, present cause
etc. (see Section 2.1) as specific inherent meanings of be going to. These
interpretations follow naturally from the present time contextualization of
the construction: a future event may be linked up to the present context in
many ways of which present intention, cause and indications are possibly the
[10] An anonymous referee of the paper points out that the examples such as (32a) are Mess odd
than they were'. He suggests that this may indicate that 'as ever, sophisticated distinctions
tend to be lost as "new" form is over-used'. This is an interesting suggestion which would
obviously have to be looked into in more detail. The study of the diachronic development
of tense selection might throw light on this issue. I have nothing to contribute to this
interesting point here.
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most typical. The following examples illustrate this type of contextualization.
Note that there is a degree of indeterminacy about which specific association
is predominant: the examples in (36) contain notions of intentionality on the
part of the subject and also notions of present indications as perceived by the
speaker.
(36) (a) You seem to have brought an awful lot of stuff with you. What
are you going to do? Play golf? Hunt or something?
(Survey of English Usage, Written material, W.5.ia.i9)
(b) - Here, give me that.
Looking away, Madeleine said sharply:
- What are you going to do?
(Survey of English Usage: Written material: 6.1.28.2)11
The same line of argument allows us to capture the claim often made that be
going to is a more immediate future than will. It is more immediate not by
inherent meaning but because one only has to access present propositions, or
more accurately propositions that one at present has reason to believe are
true.12
5.2.4. Further cooccurrences. It has been pointed out (Section 2.1.2) that be
going to is preferred in combination with already. As mentioned above,
already is an adverb of time which also has a discourse function in that it not
only indicates the time to be associated with the proposition but also the
context in which it needs to be processed, namely the present time or the
context of the utterance. Predictably, then, this adverb is to be found with the
present perfect and with be going to. Other contextual elements favouring be
going to are constructions such as / didn't realize that, did you know that,
which also serve to link the subordinate clause they introduce to the present
situation:
rare going to-i
(37) (a) I didn't realize that you I \ travel by boat.
I? will J
ris going-i
(b) Did you know that Ann \ } to get married?
I? will J
5.2.5. Equivalence. If we accept that will and be going to are truth-
conditionally equivalent, then it is not surprising that in certain sentences
they are near-interchangeable, as argued by Palmer (see Section 2.1.1). It is
when the sentences are contextualized that one construction will often be
[11] I would like to thank Professors R. Quirk and S. Greenbaum for allowing me to use the
material of the Survey of English Usage.
[12] I wish to thank Nigel Vincent for pointing this consequence out to me and for his very
helpful remarks on the phenomenon. It is interesting that the French equivalent of be going
to, the future with alter ('go') is referred to as the 'futur proche'.
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preferred over the other. Speakers may also vacillate between the two
constructions as they shift their perspective, the contextualization of the
utterance, from present to future and back. In some cases, it may indeed be
fairly immaterial in which context exactly the proposition is processed. This
would be so in those cases where in both a present and a future context there
are sufficient inferences to be derived to make the proposition relevant.
Consider for instance:
(38) (a) Now we'll have no bread left for tomorrow's breakfast.
(b) Now we're going to have no bread left for tomorrow's breakfast.
(38 a) directs the hearer towards the future implications of the proposition
(i.e. tomorrow's breakfast) and (38 b) directs him to the present implications
(i.e. what to do about the situation now). (See discussion in Section 2.2 of the
use of now in such examples.)
Given that the choice between will and be going to is not a ' grammatical'
choice, but rather one of giving processing instructions, there is inevitably a
subjective element in the selection of the future referring construction. Hence
the importance attached to the point of view of the speaker in the descriptive
studies discussed in Section 2.1. It will not be possible, indeed it would be
undesirable, to provide a hard and fast rule to determine each individual
occurrence of be going to or will. It is also to be expected that an
inappropriate use of one of the constructions by non-native speakers does
not lead to ungrammatically. The 'oddness' of (35 a) above for instance
results from contradictory processing instructions. As argued before,
however, this does not mean that we ought to consider these examples as
simply unidiomatic. As pointed out before, the idea of idiomaticity suggests
that we are dealing with an accidental property of the language, while I have
tried to show that the selection of be going to is entirely systematic. One can
arrive at a systematic description of the use of sentences with will or be going
to only in a framework that permits individual sentences to be related to sets
of background propositions, that is to say to a context.
5.2.6. Contextual inferences. The account given above also allows one to deal
with the contextual inferences associated with the use of will and be going to
in the following examples:
(39) (a) He won't finish his Ph.D. and he'll lose his job.
(b) He's not going to finish his Ph.D. and he's going to lose his job.
(39a) suggests strongly that the fact that he does not get his Ph.D. is the cause
of him losing his job; this implication is far less obvious in (39b). (39b) may
also be a mere list of negative expectations and speculations. It seems
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inappropriate to try to link the causal implication of (39 a) with the use of will
since a similar contrast to that in (39) is found in (40):
(40) (a) He didn't finish his Ph.D. and he lost his job.
(b) He hasn't finished his Ph.D. and he has lost his job.
(40 a) strongly suggests that the one event causes the other, (40 b) could be
taken as a mere list.13
Before we look into the explanation for the contrast we need to consider
the role of and in utterance processing. I shall not discuss the literature here
but I shall adopt the proposals put forward in recent work by Blakemore
(1985, 1987). Blakemore argues that the function of the coordinator and is to
indicate that
there is a conjoined proposition that has relevance over and above the
relevance of its conjuncts taken individually (1985: 7)
The hearer himself has to establish in what way the conjoined proposition
has this extra relevance. One way in which the conjoined proposition gains
relevance is in that it offers a list:
there are all sorts of reasons for producing a list. But whatever it may be
it is clear that the relevance of the utterance hinges on the fact that each
conjunct is part of a list (i.e. interpreted against the same set of contextual
assumptions) rather than on its own individual contextual implications
(1985: 5)
In other cases of coordination the relevance of the conjoined proposition will
be that there is a sequential relation between the first and the second
conjunct:
(41) (a) The king raised his glass and drank.
The second conjunct in (41 a) is interpreted as following the first. To obtain
this sequential reading the hearer has to supply propositional elements not
present in the linguistic material. In yet other cases the link between the two
conjuncts may be causal:
(41) (b) The road was icy and I slipped.
The relevance of a conjunction of propositions may also be that they are
contrastive:
(41) (c) John lives in a flat in town and Mary lives in a cottage in Devon.
Let us now return to (39). In (39a) the causal link is prominent. This is to be
expected under Blakemore's account. We have two propositions linked by
[13] One anonymous referee did not seem to agree with this parallelism. Other native speakers
I consulted shared my intuitions. Perhaps this is another instance where for some speakers
the distinctions between tense forms are being blurred?
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and. The coordinator instructs us to look for a relevance over and above the
individual relevance of the propositions. The two events referred to in
the propositions are future and moreover the use of will in each of the
propositions instructs us to contextualize them in the future. In other words,
we can process the propositions against each other, specifically the second
conjunct he'll lose his job can be processed against the proposition he won't
finish his Ph.D. One background proposition that the hearer may bring to
bear on the interpretation of (39a) is that 'if you don't finish your Ph.D. you
may lose your job' . By using this background assumption the hearer will
establish the relevance of the coordination as one of causality: one future
event may cause the other.
In (39 b) and again tells us to look for some extra relevance for the
coordinated proposition. But in both conjuncts be going to directs us towards
a present-time context. Both propositions refer to future events, but they
must not be processed against the future background of these events. The
future event in the first conjunct will thus not normally serve as the
background for the contextualization of the second conjunct. The future
related background proposition 'if you do not finish your Ph.D. you may
lose your job ' also is not accessed because it is not co-present in the time
domain set up by the choice of be going to rather than will.1* Hence the causal
link between the two conjuncts is not the obvious inference.
On the other hand, one commonality between the two propositions is their
shared present time context. Both propositions should be processed against
a present context. The sentence can, for example, be interpreted as a 'list', to
use Blakemore's terminology, of future consequences of a present situation.
Along the same lines we can explain the oddness of (42)
(42) ?He won't finish his Ph.D. and he's going to lose his job.
(42) again illustrates contradictory processing instructions: the first conjunct
tells us to look outside the immediately accessible present context to the
future and the second tells us to restrict the focus of contextualization to the
present. Assuming Smith's account of the contrast simple past vs present
perfect, the different interpretations in (40) follow in the same way as those
in (39), but with past replacing future. An account of the contrast will/be
going to in terms of processing has a better chance of capturing the
similarities between (39) and (40) than one which links the specific reading of
(38a) with the 'inherent' properties of will (cf. Wekker, 1976: 128).
6. PROBLEMS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION
My account above relates the differences between future time expressions to
linguistically encoded processing constraints, ^///-sentences and be going to-
[14] Thanks to Nigel Vincent for helpful discussion of this section. Obviously he cannot be held
responsible for the use I have made of his suggestions.
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sentences are said to be truth-functionally equivalent. If truth conditions are
determined at the level of sentence meaning, i.e. the semantic level (see
Kempson, 1987, 1988, and forthcoming for discussion though), my proposal
raises a number of problems with respect to the semantic representation of
these future tense forms. At this point I cannot offer any answers to the
problems raised and I hope that further research can throw light on them.
6.1. Tense representation™
In Section 3.2 I briefly introduced the Reichenbach type representation of
tense, and discussed the possibility that the contrast between present perfect
and simple past and that between will and be going to could be treated in
parallel fashion if one is willing to depart from Reichenbach's own analysis
of the future time expressions in English and adapt his representation of the
contrast between futur proche and futur simple to English:
(43) (a) Simple past E,R S
(b) Present perfect E R,S
(44) (a) I'm going to see John. S,R E
(b) I shall see John S R,E
The first question that may be asked is what such tense representations are
supposed to represent. Hornstein (1977) adopts the Reichenbachian system
with some modifications and associates a truth-conditional account to it:
different tense representations are linked with different truth-conditions. If
each distinct representation encodes different truth conditions, then to
assume a different representation for the constructions in (43) and (44) runs
counter to the proposal outlined above, in turn based on Haegeman (1981),
that these constructions are truth-conditionally equivalent.
Another option is to argue that the representations above (or alternative
representations of the same type, see Hornstein, 1981; Vikner, 1985, and
others) do not encode only the linguistically determined aspects of sentence
semantics, which would be relevant at the level of logical form. One might
propose that they also encode processing constraints which are not
implemented at the sentence internal level but come into play at the level of
contextualization of the utterance (cf. also Kempson, I988a,b,c for the
interaction of semantics-pragmatics with respect to deixis). On the latter
proposal one might argue that it is the element R (the ' point of reference')
that encodes the contextualization constraint. In other words, R is like a
[15] I wish to thank Sten Vikner for discussing this section with me. He is not to be held
responsible for my interpretation of his suggestions. In fact, I suspect he wholeheartedly
disagrees with it.
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grammatically encoded pragmatic connective. Reichenbach himself points
out that
the determination [of the point of reference - LH] is rather given by the
context of speech. In a story, for instance, the series of events recounted
determines the point of reference (1947: 288)
However, this approach will run into far-reaching problems once we take
into account 'complex tenses' such as the future in the past and the past
perfect, problems which I discuss in the next two sections. I do not propose
a new account of tense interpretation at the level of logical form, but merely
list the problems.
6.2. The future in the past™
The proposal that will and be going to are truth conditionally equivalent faces
serious problems when we turn to 'future in the past'. Consider (42):
(45) (a) The Queen would arrive three hours later.
(b) The Queen was going to arrive three hours later.
In the event that the Queen did not arrive, the first sentence appears to be
false, but the second is probably true. I have no complete analysis to offer
here. One way of solving the problem could perhaps be to say that (45 a)
entails (45 b) (see Kempson, 1977: 136, for a similar approach to ambiguity
and quantifier scope) and that a speaker wishing to convey (45 b) would not
be respecting the principle of relevance when uttering (45 a). This might mean
that the sentence with will (45a) is not strictly speaking 'false' but rather
increases the processing cost. By using be going to (as in (45 b)) rather than
will (as (45 a)), the speaker would have saved his interlocutor processing time
in directing him immediately to the relevant entailment, rather than leaving
him to work (45 b) out on the basis of (45 a). For a full understanding of what
is happening in (45), however, one would need to have a fully developed
account of the interaction of the different tense markers in complex tenses.
6.3. Complex tenses
The problem raised in Section 6.2 leads to the more comprehensive question
of how to treat the complex tenses. The discussion is speculative and I have
no conclusive proposal to offer. Consider the examples in (46).
(46) (a) Past perfect: He had worked.
(b) Future in the past (i): He was going to work.
(c) Future in the past (ii): He would work..
[16] This problem was pointed out to me by an anonymous referee of JL. I thank him or her
for bringing the problem to my attention and for suggesting a possible approach. Needless
to add, he or she is not to be held responsible for the use I have made of the suggestions.
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6.3.1. The past perfect. In (46 a), perfective auxiliary have is used in the past
tense. In this example have does not constrain the hearer to look for present
time propositions in which he has to process the utterance. Reichenbach
assigns the representation (47) to (46 a):
(47) E R S
If we were to posit that R encodes constraints on contextualization, then we
would conclude that (46 a) will be processed against propositions located at
a point in time prior to the moment of speech but subsequent to the Event
time. This seems intuitively to be correct. However, if R encodes processing
constraints and were to play no role in determining truth conditions, this
would also imply that the past perfect as represented in (47) is truth
conditionally equivalent to the simple past and the present perfect, since in
all three representations E precedes S and R is taken to be irrelevant for truth
functions, contrary to fact. (48 a) with a simple past is not truth conditionally
equivalent to (48 b) with a past perfect in the main clause:
(48) (a) Mary left when John arrived.
(b) Mary had left when John arrived.
It thus seems that R cannot solely be seen as a contextualization element
unless one were to envisage far reaching modifications of Reichenbach's
system. One possibility would be to modify Reichenbach's system, perhaps
by introducing further time points. I leave this for further research (see
Vikner, 1985, for an alternative system to Reichenbach).
Alternatively (following Kempson, 1988 a, b), one might develop a more
radical alternative in which the logical form of the sentence, that is the tense
representations, does not suffice to determine the truth conditions of the
propositions. Roughly, the idea would be that the logical form imposes
constraints on the truth conditions and that the contextualization then will
fully determine the truth conditions. In such a view, truth conditions would
be a function of both the semantics of tense and of its role in contextualization
and processing. Relevance theory comes into play at the latter level. At this
point I cannot provide a definitive solution for this problem. I hope that
further research into the relative role of semantics and pragmatics in
determining truth conditions may throw light on this complex issue.
6.3.2. The future in the past. The representations for 'future in the past' in
(46b) and (46c)-which correspond to the problematic (45a) and (45b)
discussed in 6.2 - raise further problems. Reichenbach proposes three
representations for the 'posterior past' illustrated in (49d):
(49) (a) R E S
(b) R S,E
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(C) R S E
(d) She told me that the letter would be sent by internal mail.
The three distinct representations are motivated by the fact that in a sentence
like (49d) the arrival of the letters may be prior to, simultaneous with, or
subsequent to the moment of speech (see Vikner, 1985, for discussion).
It is not clear to me how Reichenbach's system of tense representations
could distinguish the 'posterior future' with will in (46c) from that with be
going to in (46 b). Reichenbach himself does not discuss be going to as used
in (46 b), through the construction is said to be that used for the posterior
future.
(50) (a) He will be going to work (1947: 297).
(b) S R E.
One possible approach is to depart from Reichenbach's system and to treat
all the constructions with be going to outside the tense system properly
speaking and to treat it perhaps as some aspectual marker. In an eight tense
system such as that developed by Vikner (1985), for instance, the forms with
be going to are excluded from the tense system, as is the futur proche in
French. One argument in favour of this proposal is that be going to is found
with all tense forms. To give some examples:
(51) (a) Present tense
He leaves.
He is going to leave.
(b) Past tense
He left.
He was going to leave.
(c) Future tense
He will leave.
He will be going to leave.
(d) Present perfect
He has left.
He has been going to leave.
(e) Past perfect
He had left.
He had been going to leave,
etc.
Whichever approach one adopts for the tense representations, however, the
specific pragmatic function of be going to outlined above can be maintained.
The construction would encode an instruction to contextualize a proposition
which refers to a future state of affairs at the time determined by the
grammatical tense. For instance, in (51a) there is an instruction to process a
future proposition in the present, in (52 b) in the past. If simple past and
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present perfect are taken to be part of the tense system (as is the case in
Reichenbach, 1947, and in Vikner, 1985) this would, however, entail that the
contrast between be going to and will is treated in a way which differs from
Smith's (1981) treatment of present perfect and simple past, which was the
starting point for our discussion.
At this point I cannot solve the problems raised above. Much depends on
the overall approach to tense and aspectual auxiliaries and to the relation of
tense representations and truth conditions.
Author's address: Department de langue et lilte'rature anglaises,
Universite de Geneve,
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